Mechanisms with Monitoring for truthful RAM allocation

Hdl Handle:
http://hdl.handle.net/10149/579793
Title:
Mechanisms with Monitoring for truthful RAM allocation
Authors:
Kovacs, A. (Annamaria); Meyer, U. (Ulrich); Ventre, C. (Carmine) ( 0000-0003-1464-1215 )
Affiliation:
Teesside University. Digital Futures Institute
Citation:
Kovacs, A., Meyer, U., Ventre, C. (2015) 'Mechanisms with Monitoring for truthful RAM allocation' The 11th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE 2015), 9th-12th December 2015, CWI Amsterdam.
Publisher:
Springer-Verlag
Journal:
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Conference:
The 11th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE 2015), 9th-12th December 2015, CWI Amsterdam
Issue Date:
9-Dec-2015
URI:
http://hdl.handle.net/10149/579793
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6
Additional Links:
http://event.cwi.nl/wine2015/
Abstract:
Novel algorithmic ideas for big data have not been accompa- nied by advances in the way central memory is allocated to concurrently running programs. Commonly, RAM is poorly managed since the pro- grams' trade o s between speed of execution and RAM consumption are ignored. This trade o is, however, well known to the programmers. We adopt mechanism design tools to truthfully elicit this (multidimensional) information with the aim of designing more clever RAM allocation al- gorithms. We introduce a novel paradigm wherein programs are bound to overbidding declarations of their running times. We show the limi- tations of this paradigm in the absence of transfers and prove how to leverage waiting times, as a currency, to obtain optimal money burning mechanisms for the makespan.
Type:
Meetings and Proceedings
Language:
en
ISSN:
0302-9743
ISBN:
9783662489956
Rights:
Following 12 month embargo author can archive post-print (ie final draft post-refereeing). For full details see http://www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo [Accessed: 16/10/2015]

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.authorKovacs, A. (Annamaria)en
dc.contributor.authorMeyer, U. (Ulrich)en
dc.contributor.authorVentre, C. (Carmine)en
dc.date.accessioned2015-10-16T11:25:08Zen
dc.date.available2015-10-16T11:25:08Zen
dc.date.issued2015-12-09en
dc.identifier.isbn9783662489956en
dc.identifier.issn0302-9743en
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10149/579793en
dc.description.abstractNovel algorithmic ideas for big data have not been accompa- nied by advances in the way central memory is allocated to concurrently running programs. Commonly, RAM is poorly managed since the pro- grams' trade o s between speed of execution and RAM consumption are ignored. This trade o is, however, well known to the programmers. We adopt mechanism design tools to truthfully elicit this (multidimensional) information with the aim of designing more clever RAM allocation al- gorithms. We introduce a novel paradigm wherein programs are bound to overbidding declarations of their running times. We show the limi- tations of this paradigm in the absence of transfers and prove how to leverage waiting times, as a currency, to obtain optimal money burning mechanisms for the makespan.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherSpringer-Verlagen
dc.relation.urlhttp://event.cwi.nl/wine2015/en
dc.rightsFollowing 12 month embargo author can archive post-print (ie final draft post-refereeing). For full details see http://www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo [Accessed: 16/10/2015]en
dc.titleMechanisms with Monitoring for truthful RAM allocationen
dc.typeMeetings and Proceedingsen
dc.contributor.departmentTeesside University. Digital Futures Instituteen
dc.identifier.journalLecture Notes in Computer Scienceen
dc.identifier.conferenceThe 11th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE 2015), 9th-12th December 2015, CWI Amsterdamen
or.citation.harvardKovacs, A., Meyer, U., Ventre, C. (2015) 'Mechanisms with Monitoring for truthful RAM allocation' The 11th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE 2015), 9th-12th December 2015, CWI Amsterdam.en
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