The efficient interaction of costly punishment and commitment.

Hdl Handle:
http://hdl.handle.net/10149/583042
Title:
The efficient interaction of costly punishment and commitment.
Authors:
Han, T. A. (The Anh) ( 0000-0002-3095-7714 ) ; Lenaerts, T. (Tom)
Affiliation:
Teesside University, Technology Futures Institute
Citation:
Han, T. A. & Lenaerts, T. (2015) 'The efficient interaction of costly punishment and commitment' 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), Istanbul, Turkey, May 2015.
Conference:
14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), Istanbul, Turkey, May 2015.
Issue Date:
May-2015
URI:
http://hdl.handle.net/10149/583042
Additional Links:
http://www.aamas2015.com/en/AAMAS_2015_USB/aamas/p1657.pdf
Type:
Meetings and Proceedings
Language:
en
Description:
To ensure cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, agents may re- quire prior commitments from others, subject to compensations when defecting after agreeing to commit. Alternatively, agents may prefer to behave reactively, without arranging prior commitments, by simply punishing those who misbehave. These two mechanisms have been shown to promote the emergence of cooperation, yet are complementary in the way they aim to instigate cooperation. In this work, using Evolutionary Game Theory, we describe a com- putational model showing that there is a wide range of parameters where the combined strategy is better than either strategy by itself, leading to a significantly higher level of cooperation. Interestingly, the improvement is most significant when the cost of arranging commitments is sufficiently high and the penalty reaches a certain threshold, thereby overcoming the weaknesses of both strategies.

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.authorHan, T. A. (The Anh)en
dc.contributor.authorLenaerts, T. (Tom)en
dc.date.accessioned2015-12-01T11:37:16Zen
dc.date.available2015-12-01T11:37:16Zen
dc.date.issued2015-05en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10149/583042en
dc.descriptionTo ensure cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, agents may re- quire prior commitments from others, subject to compensations when defecting after agreeing to commit. Alternatively, agents may prefer to behave reactively, without arranging prior commitments, by simply punishing those who misbehave. These two mechanisms have been shown to promote the emergence of cooperation, yet are complementary in the way they aim to instigate cooperation. In this work, using Evolutionary Game Theory, we describe a com- putational model showing that there is a wide range of parameters where the combined strategy is better than either strategy by itself, leading to a significantly higher level of cooperation. Interestingly, the improvement is most significant when the cost of arranging commitments is sufficiently high and the penalty reaches a certain threshold, thereby overcoming the weaknesses of both strategies.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.urlhttp://www.aamas2015.com/en/AAMAS_2015_USB/aamas/p1657.pdfen
dc.titleThe efficient interaction of costly punishment and commitment.en
dc.typeMeetings and Proceedingsen
dc.contributor.departmentTeesside University, Technology Futures Instituteen
dc.identifier.conference14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), Istanbul, Turkey, May 2015.en
or.citation.harvardHan, T. A. & Lenaerts, T. (2015) 'The efficient interaction of costly punishment and commitment' 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), Istanbul, Turkey, May 2015.en
dc.eprint.versionAuthor accepted manuscripten
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